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| APPLICATION NO. | FILING DATE | FIRST NAMED INVENTOR | ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 09/003,098 | 01/06/98 | KNOWLTON E | 16904-727 |

QM12/0613

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| EXAMINER | |
|---|---|
| SHAY, D | |
| **ART UNIT** | **PAPER NUMBER** |
| 3739 | 11 |

**DATE MAILED:** 06/13/00

**Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.**

**Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks**

# Office Action Summary

| Application No. | Applicant(s) |
|---|---|
| 08/003,098 | Knowlton |
| **Examiner** | **Group Art Unit** |
| J. Shay | 3739 |

*—The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet beneath the correspondence address—*

**Period for Reply**

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If the period for reply specified above is less than thirty (30) days, a reply within the statutory minimum of thirty (30) days will be considered timely.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, such period shall, by default, expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication .
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133).

**Status**

☑ Responsive to communication(s) filed on March 20, 2000 787.

☑ This action is **FINAL.**

☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, **prosecution as to the merits is closed** in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle,* 1935 C.D. 1 1; 453 O.G. 213.

**Disposition of Claims**

☑ Claim(s) 1 – 68 is/are pending in the application.

Of the above claim(s) _____ is/are withdrawn from consideration.

☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are allowed.

☑ Claim(s) 1 – 68 is/are rejected.

☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are objected to.

☐ Claim(s) _____ are subject to restriction or election requirement.

**Application Papers**

☑ See the attached Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review, PTO-948.

☑ The proposed drawing correction, filed on _____ is ☐ approved ☐ disapproved.

☐ The drawing(s) filed on _____ is/are objected to by the Examiner.

☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.

☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner.

**Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119 (a)-(d)**

☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 11 9(a)-(d).

☐ All ☐ Some* ☑ None of the CERTIFIED copies of the priority documents have been

☑ received.

☐ received in Application No. (Series Code/Serial Number) _____.

☐ received in this national stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 1 7.2(a)).

*Certified copies not received: _____.

**Attachment(s)**

☐ Information Disclosure Statement(s), PTO-1449, Paper No(s). _____

☐ Interview Summary, PTO-413

☐ Notice of Reference(s) Cited, PTO-892

☐ Notice of Informal Patent Application, PTO-152

☐ Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review, PTO-948

☐ Other _____

**Office Action Summary**

The following is a quotation of the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

> The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.

Claims 1-68 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention.

In claim 3 exactly what constitutes "reduced cell nerosis" is unclear. In claim 3-20 no further method step is recited. In claim 28 the recitation "elctrolytic media means" is indefinite as it recites no positive function, also the extend that claim 28 is intended to encompass a device wherein the electrode is in contact with the body it is indefinite. In claims 34-37 it is unclear what further structure is recited thereby. In claim 39 there is no function positively recited in the sensor means". Claims 1 and 41 are substantial duplicates. The foregoing is merely exemplary and is not intended to be exhaustive list of the claims indefiniteness.

The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the "right to exclude" granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. See *In re Goodman*, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); *In re Longi*, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); *In re Van Ornum*, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); *In re Vogel*, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970);and, *In re Thorington,* 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).

A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on a nonstatutory double patenting ground provided the conflicting application or patent is shown to be commonly owned with this application. See 37 CFR 1.130(b).

Effective January 1, 1994, a registered attorney or agent of record may sign a terminal disclaimer. A terminal disclaimer signed by the assignee must fully comply with 37 CFR 3.73(b).

Claims 28-40 are provisionally rejected under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1, 3, 4, 12-14, 21-29, 35-38 and 46-60 of copending Application No. 08/827,237. Although the conflicting claims are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because it would have been obvious to use an ionic liquid to cool the surface..

This is a provisional obviousness-type double patenting rejection because the conflicting claims have not in fact been patented.

The other provisional obviousness type double patenting rejections set forth in the previous Office action are hereby withdrawn in view of the Terminal Disclaimer filed May 28, 1999.

The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:

> A person shall be entitled to a patent unless --
>
> (e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United States before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or on an international application by another who has fulfilled the requirements of paragraphs (1), (2), and (4) of section 371(c) of this title before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent.

Claims 28-40 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(e) as being clearly anticipated by Eggers et al ('909).

The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103(a) which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:

> (a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.

Claims 1-27 and 41-68 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Neefe in combination with Sand ('709). Neefe teaches a collagen shrinkage method using various type of energy. Sand ('709) teach a method of shrinking collogen using light. It would have been obvious to the artisan of ordinary skill to employ various forms of heating energy in the method of Sand ('709) since these are equivalents ás taught by Neefe, thus producing a method such as claimed.

Applicant's arguments filed May 28, 1999 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. This is a continuing Prosecution of applicant's earlier Application No. 09/003,098. All claims are drawn to the same invention claimed in the earlier application and could have been finally rejected on the grounds and art of record in the next Office action if they had been entered in the earlier application. Accordingly, **THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL** even though it is a first action in this case. See MPEP § 706.07(b). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).

A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO

MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no, however, event will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.

Any inquiry concerning this communication should be directed to David Shay at telephone number (703) 308-2215.

David Shay:bhw
April 27, 2000

DAVID M. SHAY
PRIMARY EXAMINER
GROUP 330